Speculative risk in the AI trade

AI Bubble Index: what would make it burst

Is the AI stock market in a bubble?

Heated, but not at bubble-peak levels, by our measure. As of November 17, 2026, the AI Bubble Index reads 56 out of 100, in the Heated band (51 to 70). It has never reached Overheated (71 to 85) or Euphoria (86 to 100) since the series began on August 20, 2026.

The most extreme reading is how the buildout is being paid for. AI chip makers led by NVIDIA and Broadcom have put up loans, guarantees, and lease backstops for their own customers worth 51.5% of the group's revenue, most of it not yet drawn. Lucent's figure in 2000 was 24%. The calmest component is momentum, at 13 out of 100.

A dashboard of market temperature from 0 to 100, computed from 9 components

AI Bubble Index gaugeA semicircular gauge from 0 to 100 with the needle at 56, in the Heated band.025507510056OUT OF 100HEATED
Cold0 to 30Building31 to 50Heated51 to 70Overheated71 to 85Euphoria86 to 100

The AI Bubble Index reads 56 out of 100, in the Heated band, as of November 17, 2026 at 2:35 p.m. ET.

Multiple indicators elevated together. The index measures speculative heat, not the odds of a crash, so it can fall during a selloff even while credit stress is rising. The score recalculates four times each weekday. 5 of its 9 components move with the market; the other 4 move only when a utility, regulator or company files something new. Every raw value, score and anchor sits below.

Why 56?

Each component's score times its weight. The contributions sum to the composite, so the longest bar is what is actually driving the reading, not just what is elevated. The previous reading was 57, down 1. Recalculates at 9:35am, 12:35, 3:35 and 6:35pm ET each weekday.

ComponentScoreWeightContribution
Commitment gap6218%11.16
Circular financing10010%10.00
Insider selling7710%7.70
Contracted cover6411%7.04
Cost of money6011.5%6.90
Counterparty concentration6310%6.30
Valuation2913.5%3.92
Momentum1310%1.30
Complacency216%1.26
Compositesum of contributions55.57 → rounds to 56

History

The series began August 20, 2026 and holds 67 daily readings; the chart shows the last 30. A ringed point marks a methodology change recorded in the changelog, so a component addition is never mistaken for a market move. Nothing before the first point is reconstructed.

0255075100596063636310-136110-2010-2711-035311-105611-17

What goes into the number

ComponentReadingScoreHow it maps
Commitment gapquarterlyIs the demand behind the buildout real?Weight 18%65.41% of announced demand unbacked

median of 7 independent screens run by grid operators, utilities and regulators

62

50 percent maps to 40 because roughly half of announced data center projects have historically failed to arrive on schedule, so that much attrition is the baseline rather than a warning. 95 percent maps to 100.

Anchors: 0 to 0, 50 to 40, 75 to 75, 95 to 100
ValuationdailyHow much is priced in?Weight 13.5%17.4median forward P/E of the AI basket

median of 10 forward P/E readings across 10 symbols

29

16 is the long-run S&P 500 median forward multiple and maps to 25. 60 maps to 100, in the region of dot-com peak multiples.

Anchors: 16 to 25, 25 to 50, 40 to 80, 60 to 100
Insider sellingdailyAre the people inside selling more than usual?Weight 10%2.4762discretionary selling against its own trailing baseline

$972M of discretionary selling across 7 of 25 AI infrastructure names in the last 90 days, against a baseline of $392M from 4 earlier windows. NVDA is 97 percent of the current window.

77

The last 90 days of discretionary selling against the median of the prior four 90-day windows, so the basket is judged against itself rather than an outside benchmark. A reading of 1.0 is its own normal rate and maps to 40. Rule 10b5-1 plans and tax withholding are excluded.

Anchors: 0.4 to 10, 1 to 40, 2 to 70, 4 to 100
Counterparty concentrationquarterlyHow few counterparties is this resting on?Weight 10%44top direct customers as % of revenue

44% of NVIDIA's revenue came from three direct customers in the first half of fiscal 2027 (NVIDIA 10-Q). Vendor financing is now scored separately under Circular financing.

63

15 maps to 20 because that is what Lucent's largest customer reached before its collapse, per its fiscal 2000 annual report. Vendor financing moved to its own component, Circular financing, on October 10, 2026.

Anchors: 15 to 20, 30 to 45, 54 to 75, 70 to 100
MomentumdailyHow far above trend is the price?Weight 10%0.915basket price divided by its 200-day average

median price to 200-day average across 10 symbols

13

A basket trading at its 200-day average maps to 30. Twenty percent above trend maps to 75.

Anchors: 0.9 to 10, 1 to 30, 1.1 to 50, 1.2 to 75, 1.4 to 100
ComplacencydailyIs any of this priced as a risk?Weight 6%25.58VIX, inverted

CBOE Volatility Index, last regular-session print

21

Inverted on purpose: a low VIX means the market is pricing no stress, which raises the reading rather than lowering it. 20 is near the long-run average and maps to 35. 45 maps to 0, the level reached at the dot-com bust peak.

Anchors: 10 to 100, 12 to 85, 15 to 65, 20 to 35, 30 to 10, 45 to 0
Contracted coverquarterlyHow much disclosed contract coverage supports the valuation?Weight 11%23.37contracted revenue as % of market value

$3372B of disclosed GAAP obligations against $14428B of market value across 21 companies

64

Inverted: cover falls as the market pays more for demand nobody has signed for, so a low reading raises the score. 100 percent, where signed contracts equal the whole market value, maps to 0; 10 percent, where nine tenths of the price rests on uncommitted revenue, maps to 100. Only 10-Q and 10-K figures count.

Anchors: 10 to 100, 25 to 60, 50 to 25, 100 to 0
Cost of moneydailyIs money getting expensive?Weight 11.5%60.33average of three sub-scores: the 12-month change in the 10-year Treasury yield, private credit funds' price to NAV, and AI borrowers' bond spread premium10-year Treasury yield, 12-month change: +98 bp (5.12% on 2026-11-16, against 4.14% on 2025-11-14) → scores 50 through its own anchors: -100 to 0, 0 to 25, 100 to 50, 209 to 85, 277 to 100Private credit funds, median price to NAV: 0.76x (OTF 0.56, TCPC 0.57, OBDC 0.75, MFIC 0.78, BXSL 0.92, ARCC 0.98) → scores 69 through its own anchors: 0.5 to 100, 0.7 to 80, 0.85 to 55, 1 to 30, 1.15 to 10AI borrowers' bond spread premium: +229 bp, the 5-day median premium (latest reading 2026-11-16: median AI issuer 457 bp vs median high-yield bond 236 bp; issuers: CoreWeave 1039, Galaxy Helios 781, Edged 709, SoftBank 522, Core Scientific 457, Applied Digital 360, Oracle 312, TeraWulf 264, Cipher 236) → scores 62 through its own anchors: -100 to 0, 0 to 20, 100 to 40, 250 to 65, 500 to 90, 800 to 100

Prices are the latest close; each fund's NAV is its most recent quarterly report, so the discount can move a few points when new NAVs are filed.

60

The raw reading is already a 0-100 score, the average of the three sub-scores, so it passes through unchanged. The rate half is calibrated to history: the 10-year yield's 12-month rise peaked at 209 basis points on January 18, 2000, two months before the Nasdaq top, which maps to 85, and at 277 basis points in November 2022, which maps to 100. A flat year maps to 25. The private credit reading is anchored arithmetically: a fund trading at exactly its net asset value maps to 30, and each 15 percent discount adds about 25. The AI borrowers' reading is how much more AI builders pay on their bonds than the typical high-yield issuer: zero premium maps to 20, 500 basis points maps to 90.

Anchors: 0 to 0, 100 to 100
Circular financingquarterlyAre suppliers paying for their own sales?Weight 10%51.55chip makers' loans, guarantees and lease backstops for their own customers, as % of revenueLoans, guarantees and lease backstops (Lucent's basis, scored): 51.6% ($251.0B of $486.9B revenue) → scores 100 through the same anchorsAdding equity stakes and capacity purchases (not scored): 71.9% ($349.9B) → scores 100 through the same anchorsExplicitly funded per filings (a minimum): 0.4% ($2.0B) → scores 2 through the same anchors

7 disclosed loans, guarantees and lease backstops: NVIDIA $128.5B, Broadcom $114.0B, AMD $8.5B, against $486.9B of trailing 12-month revenue across NVIDIA, Broadcom, AMD, Marvell, Qualcomm. Lucent's figure on the same basis was 24.0 percent. The filings do not show whether some commitments cover the same leases, so overlaps cannot be ruled out. Most of the total is undrawn or contingent.

100

Calibrated to the dot-com vendors' own 10-K disclosures: Cisco's customer financing was 11.5 percent of revenue in fiscal 2001 and maps to 50, Nortel's 17.1 percent at the end of 2000 maps to 70, and Lucent's 24.0 percent in fiscal 2000, the peak of the cycle, maps to 85. Twice Lucent's level maps to 100. Only loans, loan guarantees and lease backstops are scored, counted at their maximum, drawn or not, because those are the categories in Lucent's figure; equity stakes and capacity-purchase agreements are published beside the score but not in it.

Anchors: 0 to 0, 11.5 to 50, 17.1 to 70, 24 to 85, 48 to 100

The five things that ended the last one

Each row pairs a mechanism that actually did the damage in 2000 with today's equivalent and its current reading. All five are now measured. The last three readings come straight from the live index components below, so they update every weekday.

What ended the dot-com bubbleTodayReading
Vendor financing reversedLucent committed $8.1 billion to help customers buy its own equipment, 24 percent of its $33.8 billion of fiscal 2000 revenue, much of it to carriers the banks had already refused. Nortel had about $4.1 billion of unfunded customer financing committed at the end of 2000 and offered terms reaching 130 percent of purchase price. Lucent's revenue fell from about $30 billion to $12 billion and it lost $16.1 billion in 2001 alone.Circular financingAcross NVIDIA, Broadcom, AMD, Marvell, and Qualcomm, disclosed loans, guarantees, and lease backstops for their own customers come to about 42 percent of trailing 12-month revenue, against Lucent's 24 percent on the same basis; adding equity stakes and capacity purchases takes it to about 62 percent. The deal-by-deal ledger is below, and filings show very little of it funded yet. The largest single piece: Nvidia agreed on Aug. 17, 2026 to guarantee up to $105 billion behind an OpenAI data center in Pike County, Ohio. Against the $303.0 billion Nvidia earned in the twelve months to July 26, 2026, that is 35 percent, against Lucent's 24 percent. The direction is the interesting part: the commitment was discussed at up to $250 billion on July 27 and cut below $120 billion after investors objected to the exposure, a 58 percent reduction in three weeks. Four days later, on Aug. 21, Nvidia extended the same pattern into software: a $6 billion license of AI coding startup Poolside's model-development tools plus a separate roughly $1 billion equity stake at a $12 billion valuation, more than triple where Poolside was priced in 2024 against essentially no shipped revenue. That deal is a license and a minority stake, not a compute-purchase guarantee, so it is kept out of the reading rather than added to it, but it is the same supplier-funds-its-own-customer logic showing up a layer higher in the stack.51.6% of revenueof chip makers' revenue in loans and guarantees for their own customers
The demand was never realCapacity was built against orders from companies that had no revenue and, in many cases, no customers. The orders were real on paper. The ability to pay for them was not.The commitment gapSeven screens run by grid operators, utilities and regulators in four states each remove between 50 and 95 percent of the data center demand put to them. None of them coordinate and none uses the same method. Detail for every screen is below.65%of announced demand is unbacked
Nobody was pricing itThe VIX peaked at 45.08 during the entire dot-com collapse, a level since exceeded by a credit downgrade, a flash crash and a tariff announcement. Volatility markets did not see the biggest equity unwind in modern history while it was happening.VolatilityThis is not a safety reading. It is a complacency reading. The market is pricing essentially no stress against a pipeline that is 65 percent air and a supplier guaranteeing 35 percent of its revenue. Note that VIX is a poor detector of slow deflation: it registers sudden credit and liquidity shocks, which is why 2008 and 2020 produced readings above 80 and the dot-com bust never did.25.58VIX, against a long-run average near 19
Money got expensiveThe Federal Reserve raised the funds rate from 4.75 percent to 6.5 percent between June 1999 and May 2000. Speculative capital left first.The cost of moneyThree readings, averaged. The first is how far the 10-year Treasury yield has risen over the past year. That rise peaked at 209 basis points on Jan. 18, 2000, two months before the Nasdaq topped, and at 277 basis points in November 2022. The second is what investors pay for the listed private credit funds run by Ares, Blue Owl, Blackstone, Apollo, and BlackRock, the five managers that capped withdrawals from their non-traded credit funds this year. A fund trading well below its net asset value is the market declining to believe the loan marks. Private credit lends directly to the buildout: funds managed by Blue Owl own 80 percent of the venture financing Meta's roughly $27 billion Hyperion data center in Louisiana, and Blue Owl's non-traded technology income fund drew withdrawal requests for 39 percent of its shares in the third quarter. The third is what AI builders pay to borrow: the bonds of CoreWeave, Oracle, Applied Digital, Cipher, TeraWulf, Core Scientific, Galaxy, and Edged, priced daily, measured against the typical high-yield bond. A widening gap means lenders are charging AI borrowers more than other risky companies.+98 bp · 0.76x NAV · AI +229 bp10-year yield change, private credit funds' price to NAV, and AI borrowers' bond spread premium
Insiders sold firstLockup expirations released enormous insider supply into a market that had already stopped absorbing it.Form 4 selling in AI infrastructureDiscretionary Form 4 selling across 25 AI infrastructure companies over the last 90 days, measured against the median of the four 90-day windows before it. Sales under Rule 10b5-1 plans and shares withheld for tax are excluded.2.48xdiscretionary selling against its own trailing baseline, where 1.0 is normal

Circular financing, then and now

A supplier standing behind its customer's ability to pay for the supplier's own product. Commitments compared to commitments, because Lucent's widely quoted $8.1 billion was a ceiling: at the end of fiscal 2000 about $2.0 billion of it was outstanding, $1.3 billion of loans and $770 million of guaranteed debt, per Lucent's 10-K.

Lucent, fiscal 2000Nvidia, 2026
Financing committed$8.1 billion$105 billion
Revenue$33.8 billion$303.0 billion
Commitment as share of revenue24%35%
Largest customerstop two, 23%top three, 44%

Three differences cut in Nvidia's favor. Lucent lent to carriers with no revenue that banks had refused, and booked the resulting purchases as revenue in the same period. Nvidia is guaranteeing a 20-year lease to one of the largest buyers of computing in the world. And Lucent expanded its lending as conditions worsened, where Nvidia cut its commitment by 58 percent because shareholders objected.

NVIDIA quarterly filings; Robert D. Atkinson, Who Lost Lucent, American Affairs (August 2020)

The money loop: who funds whom

Disclosed deals in which an AI supplier puts up money, credit, or a guarantee for a customer that then buys the supplier's own product. Amounts are maximum commitments as filed, so most are undrawn or contingent. Counting only loans, loan guarantees, and lease backstops, the same categories as Lucent's figure, chip makers have committed $251B, or 51.6 percent of their $487Bof trailing 12-month revenue, against Lucent's 24.0 percent at the dot-com peak. That is the scored figure. Adding equity stakes and capacity-purchase agreements brings it to $350B, or 71.9 percent, and including Amazon, Microsoft, and Alphabet, the loop totals $494B. The filings do not show whether some commitments cover the same leases, so overlaps cannot be ruled out. Filings explicitly identify about $2.0Bof the chip makers' total as funded, a disclosure-based minimum rather than a complete count of cash paid.

Who funds whomTypeUp toStatusSource
NVIDIA → OpenAI (data-center leases at its Ohio site)Guarantee$105BSignedsec.gov
Amazon → OpenAICustomer commits to buy up to $138BEquity stake$50BFundedsec.gov
Broadcom → Anthropic (residual value backstop on the $63B lease vehicle)Lease backstop$43BSignedsec.gov
Broadcom → AnthropicCustomer commits to buy up to $125BLoan$42BSignedsec.govpartly press-reported
Alphabet (Google) → AnthropicCustomer commits to buy up to $121BEquity stake$40BPartly fundedcnbc.compartly press-reported
NVIDIA → Unnamed AI cloud partnersCapacity backstop$36BSignedsec.gov
NVIDIA → OpenAIEquity stake$30BSignedopenai.com
Broadcom → Anthropic (through an Apollo-led lease vehicle)Guarantee$29BSignedsec.gov
NVIDIA → Unnamed third parties (leases to be reassigned)Lease backstop$20BSignedsec.govpartly press-reported
Amazon → AnthropicFinancing facility$20BPartly fundedsec.gov
Microsoft → OpenAICustomer commits to buy up to $250BEquity stake$13BPartly fundedsec.gov
Amazon → AnthropicCustomer commits to buy up to $100BEquity stake$13BFundedsec.gov
NVIDIA → AnthropicEquity stake$10BSignedanthropic.compartly press-reported
AMD → Undisclosed commercial partnersLease backstop$8.5BSignedsec.gov
NVIDIA → CoreWeaveCapacity backstop$6.3BSignedsec.gov
Microsoft → AnthropicCustomer commits to buy up to $45BEquity stake$5.0BSignedanthropic.com
AMD → AnthropicCustomer commits to buy up to $20BEquity stake$5.0BAnnouncedir.amd.compartly press-reported
NVIDIA → Unnamed AI cloud partnersLease backstop$3.5BSignedsec.gov
Alphabet (Google) → AnthropicEquity stake$3.0BFundedcnbc.compartly press-reported
NVIDIA → MetaEquity stake$3.0BAnnouncednvidianews.nvidia.com
NVIDIA → IRENEquity stake$2.1BSignedsec.gov
NVIDIA → CoreWeaveEquity stake$2.0BFundedsec.gov
NVIDIA → NscaleEquity stake$2.0BPartly fundedsec.gov
NVIDIA → SB Energy (landlord of OpenAI's Ohio site)Equity stake$1.5BAnnouncedsec.gov
NVIDIA → NaverEquity stake$1.0BPartly fundedbloomberg.compartly press-reported
CoreWeave → OpenAICustomer commits to buy up to $22BEquity stake$0.3BFundedsec.govpartly press-reported

Not counted in the score: 8warrant grants that let customers buy supplier stock for little or nothing as they buy (AMD's two, to OpenAI and Meta, are worth about $199B at recent prices, all unvested), because their value moves with the share price; and 7 chip-backed loans from outside lenders such as Apollo and Blackstone, because the lender is not the supplier. Deals still in talks or reported without a filing are left out until they are confirmed.

Who carries the risk. The same structure can land on either side of the line. In June, an Apollo-led vehicle arranged $35 billion to buy Broadcom-designed racks and lease them to Anthropic, and Broadcom backstops up to $29 billion of what Anthropic owes under that lease. That backstop is why the deal counts here. SpaceX's planned $40 billion vehicle would buy Nvidia chips with money from bond investors led by Apollo, and none of the reports on the deal describe a guarantee or investment from Nvidia. Nvidia would be paid for its chips, and the lenders would hold the risk, priced in the open: earlier talks put the lowest-ranking debt at a yield in the mid-8 percent range before turmoil in AI credit reopened pricing, Bloomberg reported. Nvidia's $105 billion OpenAI deal runs the other way. Nvidia covers the shortfall if OpenAI stops paying for its Ohio data center leases, starting as each lease begins, in 2028 at the earliest. The vehicle is meant to keep the debt off SpaceX's balance sheet and protect its investment-grade ratings. But SpaceX's earlier sale-leasebacks with Valor Equity Partners did not count as sales, and $12.9 billion of that financing sat on its books as debt on Sept. 30.

Warrants and chip-backed debt (15)

Dot-com comparison, from the vendors' own annual reports: Lucent 24.0% (fiscal 2000); Nortel 17.1% (end of 2000); Cisco 11.5% (fiscal 2001). Ledger as of November 13, 2026.

What the market is pricing

The dot-com collapse never produced an extreme volatility reading. It peaked at 45.08 while the Nasdaq fell 78 percent, a level since exceeded by a credit downgrade, a flash crash and a tariff announcement. Whatever the VIX measures, it is not bubbles.

14.89today
45.08dot-com bust peakAug. 5, 2002, while the Nasdaq fell 78%
52.33April 2025 tariffshigher than the entire dot-com collapse
80.86credit crisisNov. 20, 2008
82.69covidMar. 16, 2020

VIX methodology changed in 2003, so pre-2003 figures are back-calculated from the old VXO, which ran on the S&P 100 and tends to read higher. If anything the true comparable figure for 2002 was lower than 45.08.

Inside the commitment gap

The seven screens behind the 65 percent figure, ranked by how much each removes.

Announcedshowing up in public project databases, at least this many100
Talked to the stateengaged with the environmental regulator at some level58
Filed an applicationactually applied for a permit15
Got permittedhold every permit needed to build a first phase5

Pennsylvania, counted by the state inside Executive Order 2026-05.

Who is screeningAsked forSurvivedCutTest applied
Pennsylvania DEPPennsylvania · Announced projects against fully permitted projectsAs of August 18, 2026

Disclosed by the state inside Executive Order 2026-05, which also bars DEP from issuing any data center permit before the project secures local approval. The intermediate stages are 58 projects engaged with the agency and 15 that have filed a permit application. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Executive Order 2026-05 (August 18, 2026)

100in publicly sourced databases, at least5holding every first-phase permit95%20x more asked for than got throughPermitted
Georgia PowerGeorgia · Large load pipeline against signed commitmentsAs of March 31, 2026

Filed quarterly with the Georgia Public Service Commission, which makes this the most auditable series in the set. Of the committed 12,400 MW, 8,500 MW has physically broken ground and 10 projects are already online. PSC staff testimony separately records 33 projects totalling 11,332 MW removed from the pipeline since 2023. Georgia Power, Quarterly Large Load Economic Development Report, Q1 2026, Georgia PSC Docket 56002

76,200 MWtotal pipeline through the mid-2030s12,400 MWcommitted, across 31 customers84%6.1x more asked for than got throughSigned agreement
AEP OhioOhio · Inquiries before and after a minimum-take tariffAs of February 13, 2026

The closest thing in this data to a controlled experiment. PUCO approved a tariff on July 9, 2025 requiring data centers above 25 MW to pay for at least 85 percent of the energy they subscribe to whether or not they use it, over a 12-year term with an exit fee and proof of financial viability. Four in five megawatts of stated interest did not survive being asked to pay for itself. AEP Ohio (February 13, 2026)

30,000 MWof inquiries, more than 50 customers across more than 90 sites5,642 MWafter binding financial commitments81%5.3x more asked for than got throughMoney posted
PPL Electric UtilitiesPennsylvania · Data center pipeline against signed service agreementsAs of June 30, 2026

PPL reports a third figure below the two here: 6,500 MW actually under construction. Read across all three, the pipeline converts to signed agreements at about one in three, and to steel in the ground at about one in five. PPL Electric Utilities, second quarter 2026 disclosure

31,800 MWof pipeline in Pennsylvania11,000 MWunder signed electric service agreements65%2.9x more asked for than got throughSigned agreement
ERCOTTexas · Contracted load against officer-letter attestations, 2030As of December 19, 2025

ERCOT splits its own forecast into load carrying signed interconnection agreements and load backed only by a transmission provider officer letter, which ERCOT defines as an attestation of confidence rather than a signed agreement. By 2030 the larger share of the forecast is the weaker category. ERCOT, Report on the Capacity, Demand and Reserves in the ERCOT Region, 2026 to 2030 (December 19, 2025)

47,783 MWof new large load in the 2030 planning forecast19,560 MWwith a signed interconnection agreement59%2.4x more asked for than got throughSigned agreement
ERCOTTexas · Batch Zero interconnection screenAs of July 28, 2026

ERCOT labels this preliminary. Final determinations were due Aug. 7, 2026, with results communicated by Sept. 2. The Batch Zero deadline for posting financial security and site control is planned for June 2027, which is the point where this number gets tested again. ERCOT, Assessing the Grid, presented to the Texas Senate Committee on Business and Commerce (July 29, 2026)

498 GWrepresented in the screen, 688 projects205 GWstudy-eligible, 326 projects59%2.4x more asked for than got throughAccepted for study
NERCTexas · Requested load against what NERC will countAs of January 1, 2026

NERC counts a data center project only once it has advanced from speculative and exploratory stages into development commitments. On Texas it states that new data center demand projections are reduced by almost 50 percent of their original requested load level. NERC, 2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment

100%of the originally requested load level50%after NERC screening, approximately50%2.0x more asked for than got throughAccepted for study

What survives when someone has to pay

Real capacity is being built at very large scale. These two figures are the cleanest evidence of it anywhere in the data, and they belong here rather than in a footnote.

45 GW AEPin Texas backed by fully executed Letters of Agreement · as of July 30, 2026

AEP told investors it had collected nearly $2 billion in cash or collateral for load commitments in ERCOT, covering all of the required credit support for the full 45 GW in its Batch Zero filing. Posted collateral is the cleanest available filter against one project being counted in several places at once. AEP, second quarter 2026 results and earnings call (July 30, 2026)

8,500 MW Georgia Powerof committed load that has physically broken ground · as of March 31, 2026

Concrete is the one test no press release can pass. Ten of these projects are already online and serving load. Georgia Power, Quarterly Large Load Economic Development Report, Q1 2026

Which stocks this actually touches

The ones already in the ground. A rule that slows every new entrant does not hurt a project that is already sited, permitted and locally supported. If anything it widens the moat. These are the names with real Pennsylvania exposure that mostly clear the new bar.

PPLPPL Electric Utilities

The most exposed name on this page. It reports 31,800 MW of Pennsylvania data center pipeline, 11,000 MW under signed service agreements and 6,500 MW under construction. Its growth story lives at the top of exactly the funnel this order narrows.

TLNTalen Energy

Sold its 960 MW Cumulus campus next to the Susquehanna nuclear plant to Amazon for $650 million, then expanded to a 1,920 MW power agreement running to 2042. An operating nuclear site with decades of local relationships clears a local-approval test easily.

CEGConstellation Energy

Restarting Three Mile Island Unit 1 as the Crane Clean Energy Center. Same logic as Talen: an existing licensed site, not a greenfield fight.

GEVGE Vernova

Supplying seven gas turbines to the Homer City Energy Campus, the largest project in Pennsylvania at 4.5 gigawatts and about $10 billion. The turbine order is already placed, though environmental groups are crowdfunding a legal challenge to the site.

EQTEQT Corporation

Announced an agreement in principle to supply the gas for Homer City.

AMZNAmazon

Owns the Susquehanna campus outright and has confirmed talks to take capacity at Homer City, with no deal signed.

The ones that will move anyway. These names have no Pennsylvania exposure we can find. They tend to trade on data center policy headlines regardless of geography, which is a sentiment reaction rather than a change in their business. Worth separating the two before treating a move as information.

NBIS NebiusWULF TeraWulfCRWV CoreWeaveIREN IRENCIFR Cipher MiningCLSK CleanSparkCORZ Core Scientific

There is a live precedent for that split. When New York paused state data center permits on July 14, 2026, TeraWulf finished as the biggest decliner among the AI infrastructure names we track and Nebius was close behind, despite Nebius having nothing to do with New York.

The long-run base rate

Of all generation and storage capacity that entered a US interconnection queue between 2000 and 2020, 13 percent reached commercial operation. Attrition did not stop at the paperwork either: 41 percent of the capacity that signed an interconnection agreement between 2000 and 2022 had withdrawn by the end of 2025. The median project reaching operation in 2025 took 61 months from its request, up from 36 months in 2015.

This measures generation and storage, not data center load. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory states plainly that large loads sit in separate queues its report does not cover. It belongs here as the long-run base rate for how queue capacity turns into working plant, not as a data center figure. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Queued Up: 2026 Edition (June 2026)

This is deliberately not a count of blocked or cancelled projects. That figure is quoted everywhere and comes almost entirely from one organisation whose clients are the AI industry, with recent project data behind a paywall and approved projects still sitting in its delayed column. Announcement froth is also normal: companies have always announced more than they build, so counting the froth alone tells you nothing.

Two things cut against a bearish reading. Local defeats often do not stick, as when Saline Township, Michigan rejected a $16 billion campus, was sued two days later, settled for about $14 million in community benefits and saw ground broken within two months. And friction runs both ways, since West Virginia has preempted local ordinances that limit large data center projects.

What is coming next

Related coverage

Why this index exists

The AI Bubble Index scores nine readings from grid filings, SEC filings, bond prices, and market data, publishes every raw value behind the score, and keeps a dated daily history you can download.

No one can predict the moment a bubble will burst. Any website that says otherwise is trying to sell you something. A better approach is less ambitious and more practical: identify what brought the previous bubble to an end, map those forces onto today's market, and track them. The dot-com boom did not collapse simply because investors realized stocks were expensive. It collapsed when funding dried up and much of the apparent demand proved illusory. Both conditions can be measured today.

Methodology

The method is fixed until a scheduled review after the third-quarter 10-Q filings in late November 2026. Any change after that will be dated in the changelog below.

The AI Bubble Index is a weighted composite of 9 components. Each one is scored from 0 to 100 against published anchor points, then weighted and averaged. Every raw reading, weight and anchor on this dashboard is printed here, with the source it came from and the date that reading was taken.

How the score is calculated

  1. Measure. Each of the 9 components is read from a filing, a grid operator docket, or a market price.
  2. Score. Each reading is placed on a 0 to 100 scale by drawing a straight line between its published anchor points. Example: Circular financing anchors Lucent's 24.0 percent at 85, so today's 51.5 percent scores 100.
  3. Weight and average.Index = sum of (weight × score) ÷ sum of weights. A component without a reading drops out and the others are reweighted.
  4. Band. 0 to 30 Cold, 31 to 50 Building, 51 to 70 Heated, 71 to 85 Overheated, 86 to 100 Euphoria.

Today: 62×0.18 + 100×0.1 + 77×0.1 + 64×0.11 + 60×0.115 + 63×0.1 + 29×0.135 + 13×0.1 + 21×0.06 = 55.6, rounded to 56.

The published series begins August 20, 2026 and now holds 67 daily readings. No earlier reading has been reconstructed and none will be: two of the components rest on grid screens and forward estimates that were never published for earlier periods, so any back-history would be a guess wearing a date. The composite recomputes four times each weekday.

The composite recomputes on the cadence of its fastest inputs, and each component carries its own as-of date so a quarterly reading is never presented as though it were current. No proprietary forecasts are used: every number traces to a public filing, a grid operator docket or a market series, and forward consensus estimates and preliminary grid projections appear only where they are identified as such. There is no login, no paywall and no proprietary input, and because every reading, weight and anchor is printed on this page, anyone can recompute the score by hand and get the same number. Nothing about it is tunable by the reader. The index measures how much today looks like the conditions that ended the last bubble. It does not predict when this one ends, and it is not investment advice.

Notes on the anchors

Does the score survive different assumptions?

The weights are judgment calls, so here is the same data under different ones. Published weights give 56; equal weights give 54; removing any single component and renormalising leaves it between 51 and 60. The reading is a property of the inputs, not of the weighting.

Changelog

For the demand side of the same question, our AI infrastructure backlog and RPO tracker lists what these companies have actually sold under contract, which is the one number a valuation cannot argue with.

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Questions people ask

Is there an AI bubble?

No single number can settle that, and the index does not give a yes-or-no answer. It scores how hot conditions are from 0 to 100 by measuring today's version of each thing that ended the dot-com bubble, from vendor financing to unbacked data center demand. The current reading and its band are at the top of this page. Nothing here is investment advice.

How is AIStockWire's AI Bubble Index different from other AI bubble indexes?

Much of it comes from filings, not stock prices. Four of its nine components move only when a company, utility, or regulator files something new. One is the commitment gap: announced data center capacity against the capacity backed by a signed interconnection agreement, a permit, or posted collateral. Another is circular financing: chip makers' loans and guarantees for their own customers, measured against what Cisco, Nortel, and Lucent disclosed in 2000 and 2001. The other five components move with the market, and the score updates four times each weekday. Every raw value is published, the history downloads as a CSV, and the method stays fixed until a scheduled review in late November 2026.

Why can the AI Bubble Index fall when AI stocks sell off?

Because it measures speculative heat, not crash risk. Three of its nine readings, momentum, valuation, and complacency (the VIX, inverted), cool when prices fall and fear rises, so the score drops. Stress can build at the same time, for example in AI borrowers' bond spreads, which the index smooths over a rolling median of up to five days.

When will the AI bubble pop?

Nobody knows, and the historical record is unkind to anyone claiming otherwise. The VIX peaked at 45.08 during the entire dot-com collapse, a level since exceeded by a credit downgrade, a flash crash and a tariff announcement. Volatility markets did not register the largest equity unwind in modern history while it was happening. This page therefore tracks mechanisms rather than timing.

What actually caused the dot-com crash?

Two things above all. The Federal Reserve raised rates from 4.75 percent to 6.5 percent between June 1999 and May 2000, which made speculative capital expensive. And vendor financing reversed: equipment makers had been lending customers the money to buy their equipment, with Lucent committing $8.1 billion and Nortel about $4.1 billion, often to carriers banks had already refused. Lucent's revenue fell from about $30 billion to $12 billion and it lost $16.1 billion in 2001.

What is the AI commitment gap?

The difference between data center capacity that has been announced or requested and the capacity that survives a test requiring a binding commitment: a signed interconnection agreement, a permit, posted collateral, or concrete in the ground. Across the seven screens tracked here the gap runs from 50 percent to 95 percent, with a median near 65 percent.

Which number here is the strongest evidence?

AEP Ohio. Its data center inquiries stood at about 30,000 MW. After Ohio regulators approved a tariff requiring data centers above 25 MW to pay for at least 85 percent of the energy they subscribe to whether or not they use it, expected load fell to 5,642 MW. Same market, same period, one variable changed: developers had to pay for what they had asked for.

Does this mean AI data centers are not being built?

No, and the counter-evidence is on the page deliberately. AEP has 45 GW of contracted Texas load backed by nearly $2 billion in posted cash or collateral, and Georgia Power has 8,500 MW that has physically broken ground with 10 projects already online. Real capacity is being built at very large scale. The gap is between that and the far larger announced figures that reach headlines.

Do Nvidia's price increases change the index?

Not the score, because no component here measures input costs. But it is a live reading on the cost mechanism. Bloomberg reported on August 23, 2026 that Nvidia warned major customers of price increases of at least 15 percent on Grace Blackwell and Vera Rubin server systems shipping from early 2027, as memory prices surge. Memory already makes up about 25 percent of a high-end AI rack's bill of materials, and server DRAM contract prices roughly doubled in the first quarter of 2026. Nvidia has not confirmed the report. Rising cost per unit of compute squeezes the buildout the same way expensive credit did in 2000: every committed dollar builds less than it did when the commitment was made.

Use this data

Our figures are free to reuse in articles, newsletters, and research with attribution and a link back to this page. How every number is computed: methodology. Current table as a file: download CSV.

Suggested citation: AIStockWire, “AI bubble index,” aistockwire.com/ai-bubble-index. Questions about the data: support@aistockwire.com.

Grid, utility and regulator evidence last updated August 19, 2026. A record of what those bodies and companies have published about their own exposure, not a forecast and not investment advice. Most of these bodies file quarterly at best, so this page updates as filings land rather than live.